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Abstract
The role of optimization is central to economic analysis, particularly in its “neoclassical” phase, since about 1870, and is
therefore highly compatible with the impulse behind linear programming (LP), as developed by Dantzig. LP’s stress on alternative
activities fits very well with modern economic analysis. The concept of economic equilibrium, properly understood, required the
central notion of complementary slackness. so central in LP.
LP was seen as a tool for actual implementation of neoclassical principles precisely at a time when the market was under
attack from several directions. The economists Koopmans and Hurwicz played an important role both in stimulating the crucial
development of the simplex method and in relating LP to the world of economics.
LP became widely used in national economic planning, particularly for developing countries, and for the study of individual
industries, especially the energy sector. The works of Chenery and of Manne are central in these fields.
As respect for the usefulness of the market increased, the emphasis on national planning diminished and was replaced by an
emphasis on equilibrium analysis, in which LP still plays a large part in the study of individual sectors, particularly energy.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Economic analysis, almost since its inception, has been concerned with optimization, and that in a dual sense.
For one thing, it tends to presuppose that the individual members of the economy are optimizing. Exactly what
they are optimizing and what are the constraints differ from case to case. For another thing, economic analysis is
designed not only for descriptive study of the economy but also for recommending policy, that is, for improving or
(ideally) optimizing the outcome of the economy. The second sometimes takes the form of theorems stating that, under
certain hypotheses, the spontaneous actions of the economy result in an optimum. Sometimes instead it is asserted
that government policies (taxes, tariffs, price regulations, government expenditures) are needed for optimization or
improvement.
Since linear programming is concerned above all with optimization under constraints, albeit under a special set of
conditions, it is not surprising that linear programming has been closely related to economics and has emerged as a
major instrumentality for certain purposes. Much of this connection is illustrated in George Dantzig’s work, both in
the development of the simplex method and in its adoption as a major tool of economic model building.
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2. Production and optimization
The chief agents in the economy are the consumers and the producers. In modern economic analysis (from about
1870), both are assumed to be optimizing. However, it is the optimization on the part of the producers that has in many
ways dominated the analysis and is closer to linear programming.
The characteristic assumption is that of perfect competition, though broader concepts (e.g. monopoly) appeared
already in the first half of the nineteenth century [13, Chapter 5], [43, Book III, Chapter II, section 5; first edition,
1848]. Under competition, the individual firm (or other producing unit) takes the prices at which it buys inputs and
sells output as given, so that its payoff is a linear function of output and inputs. (Monopoly would imply that the payoff
function is nonlinear.) The constraints are defined by the different methods of producing the output from the inputs and
by the resources that are given to the firm and not purchasable on the market. An early example is Ricardo’s analysis
of farming [47, Vol. I, Chapter II; originally published in 1817]. The farmer has a given amount of land available.
He can hire labour at a fixed wage; Ricardo assumed that additional units of labour have diminishing productivity.
Then, given the price of the product and the wage rate, there is an optimal amount of labour. Ricardo considered more
generally the case where different pieces of land have differing productivities. In general, some pieces of land will not
be used, i.e. will be slack variables in LP terms.
This emphasis on choice among alternative ways of producing a single good was not universally applied. Ricardo’s
description of industrial production was less well developed than that of agriculture, but implicitly, at least, there
seemed to be only one way of producing a given industrial good. This hypothesis was set forth explicitly by Walras in
the first edition of his work (1871; see [51]). Once data were available on the sales and purchases between industry, this
constant-coefficients hypothesis became (much later) the theoretical basis for Leontief’s input–output analysis [30].
Although the absence of alternative processes hardly pointed to the value of linear programming in choosing among
alternatives, input–output analysis exhibited activities as vectors and supplied the data which helped make possible
the application of linear programming to national economies.
The analogue of Ricardo’s analysis of agriculture began to be developed for industry in general in the form of the
production function, which relates the output of an industry to its inputs. In particular, this formulation implies that
different combinations of inputs can yield the same output. This concept appeared in the 1880s; see [9] and in the later
editions of Walras’s book (cited above). As in Ricardo’s analysis of agriculture, the firm maximized profit, which was
a linear function of output and inputs. If the production function is written as
y = F(x), (1)
where y = output, and x is the vector of inputs; if we let p be the price of output and q the vector of input prices, then
profit (Π ) is given by
Π = pF(x)− qx (2)
and optimization entails the obvious conditions that
Fx = q/p (3)
provided that, at the optimum, xi > 0, all i .
Suppose we interpret the production function as applying to the entire economy, and suppose further that we
imagine an economy with only one output and with inputs as given in magnitude. That is, the inputs are themselves
not produced but are ultimate factors of production, such as land, labour and capital (the latter is indeed produced, but
at any moment of time the amount is given by past decisions). Let ξ be the vector of initial supplies of inputs.
Suppose (3) has a solution for each set of possible values of the input price vector q, x = x(q). Then for feasibility
we must have
x(q) = ξ,
so that q is determined by the production function, F and the supply of inputs, ξ . It is now simple to see that the vector
q can be considered as a vector of Lagrange multipliers (or dual variables or shadow prices). Consider the problem of
maximizing the value of output subject to the constraints, x = ξ . Then we get exactly the relations (3). A component,
qi represents the unit value of an infinitesimal variation in the amount of the corresponding input, ξi .
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Here the optimization of output for a given input vector was trivial, since output is determined by inputs. However,
a simple generalization makes clear the allocative role of the input price vector. Suppose there are many outputs
yi , with corresponding prices pi , taken as given. Let F i (x i ) be the output of commodity i when the i th industry is
allocated a vector of inputs, x i . Then maximizing the value of production requires maximizing Σ pi Fi (x i ) subject
to the constraints, Σ x i = ξ . Again this procedure will lead to a vector, q, of Lagrange multipliers, which can be
interpreted as the prices of the inputs. Notice that each industry, taking input prices as given, will maximize its profits,
while in the aggregate, demand for the input will equal the given supply. This optimality of the market is part of what
Adam Smith called, “the invisible hand,” generally referred to today as the basic theorem of welfare economics.
The assumption that every input is a factor in fixed supply is made here only for expository simplification.
Individual firms may use the outputs of other firms as inputs, along with primary factors.
One of the assumptions made in the development of the theory of production was that the production function
(or industry production functions) displayed what was called, “constant returns to scale,” or, mathematically, that the
function F was homogeneous of degree 1. The argument was the standard one for linear programming; if an activity
can be carried on, it can be carried on at any scale, with inputs and outputs changed in the same proportion. Under
this assumption, it was early shown [52], that factor payments, qξ , must necessarily equal revenues, pF(ξ), or, in the
many-output case, Σ pi F i (x i ). The identity with the equality of the values of the primal and dual problems in linear
programming is evident.
The production function concept was much discussed in the literature, and indeed some limitations pointed out, in
particular, that there may be limits to the ability to substitute one input for another while maintaining output. But there
was little or no empirical implementation until the very important work of Cobb and Douglas [10]. They exploited not
only the production function itself but also its dual characteristics as developed above. Their application was to the
national economy, so they assumed there was just one output and two inputs, capital (K ) and labour (L). They used
the particular form of a power function,
F(K , L) = AK αL1−α. (4)
They fitted this relation to data. But they also noted that, from (3) and (4), it follows that the shares of capital and labour
in total output are α and 1− α, respectively. It turned out that the shares of capital and labour were roughly constant
and at a value for which (4) fitted the data pretty well. This result started a long series of successive improvements.
3. Equilibrium and complementary slackness
In general competitive equilibrium (a concept which goes back in explicit form to Walras (1874, 1877); see [51]),
prices are given to the individual firms and other economic agents such as consumers. Thus the choices of inputs and
outputs by individual firms are functions of those prices. By summing over all firms and consumers, the total demand
for any input is a function of prices. There was a concept that, if the supplies of the inputs are given to the economy,
prices are determined by the conditions that supply and demand be equal for all factors of production.
It was always understood, though informally, that the last statement could not be true literally. There were some
factors of production, e.g. air, and, in many localities, water, which were so abundant that an addition would not
increase production. In those cases, supply exceeded demand. A full recognition and formal restatement first appeared
in the work of Zeuthen [54]. The equilibrium condition on a factor market was restated: supply must be at least equal
to demand; if greater, then the factor price was zero. Thus, the principle of complementary slackness was first given
explicit notice. It played a basic role in the following literature on the consistency of the equations and inequalities of
competitive equilibrium [49,50,42,1].
Most current economy-wide models are equilibrium models, rather than linear programming models, but they
incorporate large elements of linear programming within them.
4. The development of linear programming and the role of economists
It may therefore be understood that at least some economists were receptive to a “bottom-up” approach to
optimization. From an empirical viewpoint, it meant using a direct knowledge of the technology instead of simply
inferring it from a black box in which only outputs and inputs were observable. Leontief encouraged his students to
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use technological data to derive industry production functions; for (nonlinear) examples, see [4]. This role has been
decisive in many of the most fruitful applications of linear programming to economics.
A second point in the acceptance of and indeed enthusiasm for linear programming was that it gave directions
as to what policies to take (that is, what activity levels to use) to achieve an optimum. The traditional doctrine that
the market would automatically yield an efficient outcome was at that time under considerable criticism from several
directions. (1) It had long been agreed that the efficiency of the market held only for competitive markets; there
was considerable empirical basis for the view that monopoly power was steadily increasing. (2) The efficiency of
the market also depended on the absence of what came to be known as, “externalities”, cases where actions by one
individual or a firm impinged on others without the intervention of the market, as with environmental effects. The
importance of external effects had especially been emphasized in the widely-known work of Pigou [46]. (3) Collateral
to these discussions had been a controversy over the feasibility and efficiency of a socialist economic system. Some
economists opposed to socialism, most notably [44,45] had held that a socialist economy could not be viable or at any
rate would be very inefficient. The so-called “market socialists” recognized the efficiency of competitive equilibrium
but argued, (a) that the actual capitalist economy was far from efficient for reasons (1) and (2) above, (b) the capitalist
economy yielded a very unequal distribution of income, and (c) a socialist economy could be devised which would
achieve efficiency by specifying appropriate operating rules to the planning agencies and individual socialist firms.
These propositions had been advanced by many authors. An early paper was that of Enrico Barone in 1906; for
an English translation, see [2]. There were many papers on this subject during the period between the two World
Wars but perhaps most notably that of Lange [28]. (4) The Great Depression had undermined any entire reliance
on the unconstrained market. (5) World War II created an opportunity for rethinking military and related issues in
accordance with principles of rationality, i.e. optimizing. This tendency became known as, “operations research.” It
created a demand for applying economic reasoning to the solution of highly specific and narrow problems, as opposed
to the broader questions with which economists had traditionally grappled.
For all these reasons, an approach which permitted the solution of well-posed optimizing questions in specific
numerical terms resonated well with at least some economists. Tjalling Koopmans was one such. As a graduate
student in physics in the Netherlands, he wrote a highly-regarded paper on calculating quantum wave functions. But
his social concerns led him into economics, originally into the nascent field of econometrics, that is, the development
of statistical methods appropriate to the special problems of economics. He participated in the major study of business
cycles conducted at the League of Nations under the leadership of another Dutch economist, Jan Tinbergen. A more
junior associate in this group was Leonid Hurwicz, a young Polish economist with mathematical interests. As France
fell to the German advance in World War II, both Koopmans and Hurwicz managed to get on some of the last
ships to leave for the United States (in 1940). Koopmans was, for some time, associated with the (British-American)
Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and with the British Merchant Shipping Mission in Washington. His duties
were apparently primarily as a statistician, but he became aware of the resource allocation problem which later became
known as the transportation problem. Given a number of ports and, for each pair of ports, an amount to be shipped
from one to another, the aim is to minimize the number of ships needed. He developed an effective algorithm to solve
this problem, though, from his account, it does not seem to have been used. His work was not published at the time.
An informal account is given in [23] and the complete results are presented in [26]. (Actually, a similar solution had
already been obtained by Hitchcock [19], unknown to Koopmans.)
Dantzig, in his initial and classic presentation of the simplex method [14] tells us (fn. 1) that, “The general nature
of the ‘simplex’ approach . . . was stimulated by discussions with Leonid Hurwicz. The author is indebted to T. C.
Koopmans, whose constructive observations regarding properties of the simplex led directly to a proof of the method
in the early fall of 1947”. In preparing this paper, I asked Leonid Hurwicz for his recollections as to how contacts
were made and what was their nature [20].
He had been employed during World War II at the Institute of Meteorology of the University of Chicago in a
programme teaching mathematics and other subjects to soldiers preparing to enter training to be weather forecasters.
Koopmans moved to the University of Chicago as a professor of economics and a senior member of the staff of
a research organization, the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics. Hurwicz and I subsequently became
Research Associates of this group.
One of Hurwicz’s colleagues at the Institute of Meteorology, an applied mathematician, had moved to the National
Bureau of Standards, where he became aware of the linear programming formulations of activity analysis by Dantzig
and Marshall Wood (later reprinted as [53,15]). Hurwicz’s colleague conveyed to him Dantzig’s search for an effective
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algorithm. Koopmans had already told Hurwicz something of his work on the transportation problem. As Hurwicz put
it to me, he didn’t fully understand either linear programming or the transportation problem, but he could recognize
that the two were similar.
Koopmans recognized both the conceptual importance of linear programming and the practical significance of the
simplex method as making the method effective in use. He organized a conference in June, 1949, to bring together
the different intellectual communities involved in the development and applications of linear programming, including
its implications for economic theory; the proceedings were published [24]. The centerpiece was, of course, Dantzig’s
paper presenting the simplex method and published for the first time [14]. This gave an important degree of publicity
to Dantzig’s work and certainly helped in its diffusion. It also made clear that the mathematical concept of, “dual
variables”, so important in linear programming theory, were essentially what the economist called, “prices”, or, more
properly, “efficiency prices”. This way of thinking made it easier for economists to understand the uses of linear
programming and also gave the linear programmers more intuition about what their algorithm was doing.
A number of the papers in [24] applied linear programming concepts to economic theory. Most notable was [25]
which reconsidered the whole theory of production, as sketched in Section 2, and showed that it could be expressed
in terms of the activity analysis underlying linear programming.
There was a troubling postscript. In 1975, the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded jointly
to Koopmans and Leonid V. Kantorovich, a Soviet mathematician, “for their contributions to the theory of optimum
allocation of resources”, i.e. essentially for their development of linear programming.1 Koopmans was very disturbed
that Dantzig did not share the prize. He even considered rejecting the prize on this basis (he spoke to me about this
possibility), but eventually did accept it. However, possibly because of these reservations, he donated one third of his
share of the prize money to the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (with which both he and Dantzig
had connections) for a lecture series.
5. The use of linear programming in economic planning
I will not be able to give a genuine survey of the applications of linear programming in economics; they have been
too numerous and too diverse. I will concentrate on the works of two scholars, Hollis B. Chenery, and Alan S. Manne.
As we shall see, most of the work has been concerned with national economic planning, with particular reference to
developing countries. This work has gradually dwindled over time, metamorphosing into general equilibrium models.
The area of general economic analysis in which linear programming has retained and even increased its usefulness,
although with more input from equilibrium analysis, has been the interaction of the energy sector with the general
economy.
Chenery, who had an undergraduate engineering background and therefore some knowledge of mathematics, had
worked with Leontief as a Harvard graduate student. Even before joining the Economics Department at Stanford
University, he had been an official in the United States foreign aid activities and had become involved in particular
with the economic development of southern Italy, a very poor region at that time (1951–1952). At Stanford, he
started a research programme on economic development. His work had relied heavily on Leontief’s input–output
analysis, i.e. fixed coefficients for each product. I suggested to him once that economic development, if it meant rising
productivity, must involve replacement of one activity by another to take advantage of changing factor availabilities,
especially an increase in capital relative to labour. When he asked how this could be done, I told him of linear
programming, which was already being taught at Stanford in the Statistics Department. He was interested only in
results, not in theory, and saw immediately the possible applications. On my recommendation he hired a graduate
student, Harvey Wagner, subsequently a major scholar in linear programming and other branches of operations
research, and within a year or two was employing the simplex method in economic development models.
1 Kantorovich had indeed formulated the linear programming model and proved the duality theorems as early as 1939 [21]. He did not, however,
have any general algorithm, so he could solve only very small problems (by trial and error). There was a general (possibly inaccurate) perception
at the time that the Nobel selection committee was making every effort to show its impartiality by giving the award to a Soviet contributor, but,
because of political considerations, serious economic analysis in the Soviet Union was impossible. Kantorovich’s work was clearly important and
worth the prize. In fact, the Soviet authorities stopped his work because, although couched in terms useful to individual industries, it clearly had
important resemblances to “bourgeois” economics. As a result, he could not publish a serious extended account of his work until 1959, translated
into English in 1965 [22]. His work was therefore unknown to Dantzig and the entire Western linear programming community at a crucial time in
the development of the subject.
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Within a few years, Chenery had become not only a user of linear programming methods in economic development
but a strong advocate and disseminator. With a collaborator, he published a textbook for economists [7]. Also, Chenery
developed strong research organizations in economic development at Stanford and later at Harvard. He also served
as a high official in the United States Agency for International Development and later as Chief Economist of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank). In all these capacities, he used his position
and funds to encourage the development by others, particularly junior scholars, of quantitative models, largely or
entirely based on linear programming, to study the policies needed by developing countries.
Among his own applications of linear programming, three stand out in my judgment. In [5], he used linear
programming to examine the interdependence of investment decisions. The model was dynamic; investment gave rise
to durable capital. If one industry needs to buy some inputs from another, there must be investment in both industries.
This paper showed how one could concretely compute these interdependent investments. [6] was one of the first
economy-wide models, in this case a model of Israel. Whereas most previous studies had considered relatively closed
economies, such as India, a small nation like Israel necessarily had a large foreign trade component. These factors
were brought out very clearly.
Finally, and perhaps most influential of the three papers, [8] took further the emphasis on the foreign trade sector.
Since it was assumed that foreign exchange rates as well as domestic interest rates were rigid, there emerged a “two-
gap” picture, with both a domestic imbalance between saving and the need for investment and an imbalance in the
balance of trade. This analysis was used both to argue for the need for foreign aid and to direct it between alternative
channels. This paper had a considerable influence on research and also on policy.
Nevertheless, it proved to be misleading. In the next decade, there emerged a greater emphasis on the flexibility of
the market, so that the rigidities assumed by Chenery and Strout were not as binding as they assumed. Their data were
largely drawn from the Korean experience, and it was precisely Korea’s success in exporting that showed the limits of
the two-gap model.
Alan Manne was also a quantitative analyst from his graduate student days, also at Harvard and under the
influence of Leontief. His interests were unusually industry-specific, one might say operations-research-orientated,
for a graduate student in economics; his dissertation was on the scheduling of petroleum refining operations. This led
to a lifelong interest in the energy sector.
His early years (1952–1956) at the RAND Corporation brought him into contact with George Dantzig and the
value of linear programming. Much of his work at this tjme dealt with developments of linear programming to extend
its range. One paper was more like a standard economic analysis, a linear programming model of the United States
petroleum refining industry [34].
After entering academia (he has been on the faculties of Yale, Stanford and Harvard Universities), Manne
constructed some of the most sophisticated linear programming models for economic development, in particular,
for India [41] and for Mexico [36]. These models were more explicitly dynamic than earlier ones and brought out and
resolved some of the difficulties in such models.
The model for India led to an illuminating controversy showing the interactions of policy research and politics.
The research organization responsible for it was the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. Classified work for the Department of Defense was also carried out there. In an early run of the model, a
strong preference for increased support of agriculture in India was indicated. This was contrary to a prevailing view,
particularly in leftist circles in India, that the cure for backwardness was rapid industrialization. As a result, there was
a campaign in India attacking the model’s conclusions as an American conspiracy to prevent India’s growth, carried
out through a research centre which was allegedly secretly under the control of the American military. I may add that
no serious economist doubted the correctness of the model’s emphasis on agriculture, and indeed India’s later policies,
after the Green Revolution, agreed.
Manne’s later research exemplified and partly stimulated the general redirection of linear programming models in
economics toward the interactions between a specific industry, usually the energy industry or some part of it, and the
economy as a whole. The fact of their mutual interaction (the price of energy affects the economy, while the state of
the economy determines in part the demand for energy) is an essential implication of economic analysis. At the same
time, there is a wealth of technological information about the energy sector which can be incorporated in the model.
Manne introduced a number of new questions for study in his work on energy–economy interactions. Manne [35]
considered water projects with multiple outputs (flood control, hydroelectric power, and irrigation). Manne [37]
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developed a dynamic model where there is an anticipated technological change; this was a powerfully influential
study which introduced a number of new concepts.
These papers put the energy sector in the foreground. His subsequent studies, beginning with [38] were models
which gave equal emphasis to the economy as a whole and to the energy sector. As they developed, the need for two
modifications became apparent: (1) objectives and some constraints were nonlinear; and (b) the appropriate models
were equilibrium models rather than simple maximization.
6. Planning models and information transfer
There was considerable interest in economic planning in postwar Europe. Of course, the Soviet Union and its
satellites were in principle engaged in very comprehensive planning, though the actual procedures were very simple
and far from optimal. The countries of Western Europe were also committed in varying measures to detailed planning
of the economy. Linear programming appeared to offer a practical method for handling the very large-scale models
implicit in planning. A conference held by the International Economic Association surveyed these developments [33].
The motives for planning which led to the employment of these models has been discussed in Section 4 above.
A critical problem in highly detailed models was that of information on the coefficients of the activities. The
idea of collecting all the information in advance to set up the model was clearly preposterous; indeed that had been
one of the main objections to the viability of a socialist economy by Von Mises [44,45]. The reply by proponents
of socialism or any highly planned economy was to acknowledge the problem and propose an iterative approach in
which some signals (say, tentative prices) would be announced and the individual firms who possessed the knowledge
would choose a production plan optimal at those prices (e.g. [28]).
How could this problem of information flow be handled in a linear programming set-up? In fact, George
Dantzig recognized this issue very early; when the (known) zeros in the coefficient matrix had a particular pattern
(corresponding to the decomposition of production into small clusters which give rise to firms), then Dantzig
and Wolfe [17] showed how the simplex method could take advantage of this structure. Issues of this kind were
also stressed by Kornai and Lipta´k [27], who were trying to rationalize the planning process in Hungary, and by
Malinvaud [31,32]. (Kornai and Lipta´k found that with the limited computational facilities available to them in
Hungary, they could not implement the simplex method and so used a variation of the method of fictitious play.)
In the end, none of these proposals found any significant application in national economic planning on either side
of the Iron Curtain.
7. Equilibrium models
Linear programming models of the economy presupposed a single decision maker with a linear objective function.
The limitations of these assumptions became apparent. The nonlinearity of the objective function meant only that
the emerging algorithms for nonlinear programming had to be used. Dantzig himself sought to derive a nonlinear
objective function for the United States economy from the utility functions of consumers [16]; however, this study
had no impact.
More serious was the presence of multiple decision makers. This gave rise to the need for equilibrium models.
Indeed, this was precisely the situation envisaged in the competitive equilibrium models discussed in Section 2.
The individual firms and consumers were independent decision-makers, and, in an international context, so were
other governments. Each decision maker took as given the decisions of other decision makers. In most models,
this interaction took the form of taking prices as given. The predictions could be made on the basis of alternative
assumptions about international agreements (e.g. trade liberalization or tradable emission permits for CO2) or on the
basis of alternative policies for one single government anticipating the reactions of others.
This shift in emphasis also fitted in with a general disillusionment with economic planning. While individual
government and international systems could be evaluated with these models, comprehensive planning was no longer
considered either feasible or desirable.
Most of the economic literature is concerned with competitive equilibrium, in which prices play an important role,
but the Nash equilibrium of games has very much the same mathematical features.
Solving equilibrium models is equivalent to finding the fixed point of a suitable mapping and is intrinsically more
difficult than finding an optimum of any kind, certainly more difficult than solving a linear program. Nevertheless,
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linear programming had something to contribute. Lemke and Howson [29] developed an algorithm, suggested
by linear programming but not identical with it, for finding the Nash equilibrium for two-person non-zero-sum
games. Cottle and Dantzig [11,12] formulated a more general “linear complementary problem” and found alternative
algorithms. Manne and Dantzig [39] found an application for the complementarity algorithms in the context of a
dynamic model under special assumptions. Scarf [48], building on Lemke and Howson, found a general method for
approximating fixed points which could be applied to solving for the solutions of competitive equilibrium models. Of
course, the algorithm required much more computer time than linear programming problems of a corresponding size.
Although general equilibrium models had been solved by various ad hoc methods even before the publication of
these papers, they gave a tremendous impetus to further developments. Many new solution methods were found, and
it would go too far afield to discuss them here. I must call attention to the paper of Chao, Manne, and Wilson [3],
which proposed a solution to equilibrium models by a series of linear programs. Convergence was not guaranteed, but
in practice it worked very well.
The applications were even more numerous. I mention only the representative and important MERGEmodel, which
treated world energy–economy interactions by considering separate regions of the world (with differing technologies)
as participants in the world economy [40]. It built on the earlier linear programming models but went to a full
equilibrium framework. However, as in many general equilibrium models today, large parts of industry retain a linear
structure and use the simplex algorithm as an auxiliary to the full solution.
8. Postscript
The linear programming formulation of economy-wide problems had its impact because it caught essential
properties of the system and because it could be implemented through the simplex method of George Dantzig. It
was very useful in many contexts, especially in transportation and energy studies. It reached its limits, as both inner
logic and the shifting evaluation of the market brought out. The algorithms used to solve the equilibrium models now
dominant and much used are descended from the simplex method. No doubt there will be newer models which will
replace these while incorporating much of their thinking and their modes of solution.
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